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I. INTRODUCTION
Article VI, section 12 of the Nevada Constitution states, "Judges shall not
charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and
declare the law."' Similar language, codified by the Nevada legislature, forbids
district judges from commenting upon the truth or falsity of evidence or its
credibility.2 The Supreme Court of Nevada has repeatedly held that these pro-
visions prohibit trial judges from commenting on the evidence presented at
trial3 and that violation of these "constitutional and statutory prohibitions [are]
subject to the rule of harmless error' 4 and may warrant a new trial.5 In circum-
* "Foot-in-mouth disease" has been described as "[a] capacity for saying the wrong or
inappropriate thing. The term is a play on the foot-and-mouth disease of livestock and on
the old saying about putting one's foot in one's mouth. Prince Philip of Great Britain coined
the word 'dontopedology' to express the tendency." JAMES ROGERS, THE DICTIONARY OF
CLICHES 112 (Ballantine Books 1985). This note explores the tendency of some judges to
improperly interject commentary during trials, in particular judicial comments regarding the
evidence. In effect, those judges "put their feet in their mouths," if you will, by saying the
wrong or inappropriate things in what is supposed to be a dignified - even hallowed - arena.
An epidemic it is not, but improper judicial commentary on the evidence may be properly
analogized to a chronic disease, recurring at inopportune moments.
t J.D. 2003, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. The author
would like to express sincere thanks to his wife, Heidi, and children, Taylor and Zachary, for
their patience and support in his law school endeavors, particularly during the writing of this
note. Additionally, the author wishes to thank Professor Leah Kane for valuable suggestions
and countless law review staff for their kindness and patience in editing this piece.
2 NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
3 NEV. REV. STAT. 3.230 (2001) provides:
District judges shall not charge juries upon matters of fact but may state the evidence and declare
the law. In stating the evidence, the judge should not comment upon the probability or improba-
bility of its truth nor the credibility thereof. If the judge states the evidence, he must also inform
the jury that they are not to be governed by his statement upon matters of fact.
4 See Gordon v. Hurtado, 541 P.2d 533, 535-36 (Nev. 1975); Wheeler v. Twin Lakes Riding
Stable, Inc., 500 P.2d 572, 573 (Nev. 1972).
5 Wheeler, 500 P.2d at 573. See also NEV. R. Civ. P. 61, which states:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling
or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for
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stances where a court finds that a judge's comments relating to the evidence are
harmful, "[a] full and fair jury trial could not [have] occur[red]." 6 The ratio-
nale of these rules is clear: litigants should be entitled to fair trials by juries free
from external influences, including gratuitous commentary by trial judges.7
An examination of the Nevada cases addressing these issues, however,
reveals inconsistencies as to when a judge's comments will be ruled to have
crossed the line of impropriety, thus warranting a new trial. Perhaps most tell-
ing of these inconsistencies is the Nevada Supreme Court's seeming drift away
from the application of the rule of harmless error in a case involving violations
of constitutional and statutory prohibitions against judicial commentary on the
evidence. In Oade v. State,8 the Nevada Supreme Court held that the trial
judge's improper comments on the evidence and other egregious conduct war-
ranted a new trial.9 The court reached its decision to reverse and remand for a
new trial by analyzing the trial judge's comments based on a "clearly erroneous
and potentially prejudicial" standard.10 A review of Nevada case law reveals,
however, that Oade failed to consider the established rule of analysis in cases
where a judge has violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions: the rule
of harmless error. " Consequently, Oade represents a substantial change in
Nevada law, without apparent justification.
This Note explores Nevada's prohibitions against judicial commentary on
evidence in light of the rule of harmless error. Part II of this note provides an
introduction to the underlying issues in Oade, and Part III provides a brief
synopsis of the rules that have historically governed judicial commentary on
evidence during trials, including a comparison between the rules at common
law, in federal courts, and in state courts. Part IV of this note will briefly
outline the history and purpose of the harmless error rule. Subsequently, Part V
will highlight Nevada's erratic disposition of these issues by analyzing Nevada
case law, comparing those comments have amounted to misconduct or
improper commentary on the evidence with those that have not. This Part will
also illustrate how improper judicial commentary on the evidence in Nevada
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise dis-
turbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
6 See Gordon, 541 P.2d at 535-36; Wheeler, 500 P.2d at 573; Peterson v. Pittsburg Silver
Peak Gold Mining Co., 140 P. 519, 520-21 (Nev. 1914).
7 Wheeler, 500 P.2d at 573.
8 See Parodi v. Washoe Med. Ctr., Inc., 892 P.2d 588, 589-90 (Nev. 1995) (citations
omitted).
9 960 P.2d 336 (Nev. 1998).
lO Id. at 339-40. Note that, in Oade, the trial judge's improper conduct was not confined to
improper comments relating to the evidence. The judge "expressed his impatience with
Oade's counsel in the presence of the jury," and also assessed repeated fines and "issued
warnings to Oade's counsel for minor transgressions." Id. at 339. While the court found
that the district judge's conduct on the whole, including his conduct not related to his com-
ments of the evidence, warranted a new trial, Id. at 339-40, a cursory reading of the case
clearly reveals that the most egregious conduct committed by the trial judge was his
improper comments on the evidence. Consequently, only those violations constitute the sub-
ject of this note.
'1 Id. at 339-340.
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has historically been governed by the doctrine of harmless error. Further, Part
V will contrast previous Nevada decisions with Oade, stressing the Oade
Court's unfortunate failure to follow Nevada precedent in evaluating the facts
presented therein.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Nevada State Gaming Control arrested Blake Oade ("Oade") at the
Clarion Hotel and Casino in Reno, Nevada, on May 5, 1994.12 He was
accused, pursuant to NEVADA REVISED STATUTES 465.07013 and 465.088,14 of
fraudulent gaming for twice unlawfully increasing bets he made during a black-
jack game, after the cards had been dealt.15 At trial, Oade argued that his
actions were not an attempt to commit fraud upon the casino, but rather were
the results of being intoxicated on the morning of the incident.1 6 He attempted
to explain his mistakes, stating that in the first instance, "he must have mistak-
enly dropped extra chips on his original bet after the cards had been dealt
12 See id. at 339.
13 Id. at 337.
14 In 1994, NEV. REV. STAT. 465.070 provided:
It is unlawful for any person:
(1) To alter or misrepresent the outcome of a game or other event on which wagers have been
made after the outcome is made sure but before it is revealed to the players.
(2) To place, increase or decrease a bet or to determine the course of play after acquiring knowl-
edge, not available to all players, of the outcome of the game or any event that affects the
outcome of the game or which is the subject of the bet or to aid anyone in acquiring such
knowledge for the purpose of placing, increasing or decreasing a bet or determining the course of
play contingent upon that event or outcome.
(3) To claim, collect or take, or attempt to claim, collect or take, money or anything of value in
or from a gambling game, with intent to defraud, without having made a wager contingent
thereon, or to claim, collect or take an amount greater than the amount won.
(4) Knowingly to entice or induce another to go to any place where a gambling game is being
conducted or operated in violation of the provisions of this chapter, with the intent that the other
person play or participate in that gambling game.
(5) To place or increase a bet after acquiring knowledge of the outcome of the game or other
event which is the subject of the bet, including past-posting and pressing bets.
(6) To reduce the amount wagered or cancel the bet after acquiring knowledge of the outcome of
the game or other event which is the subject of the bet, including pinching bets.
(7) To manipulate, with the intent to cheat, any component of a gaming device in a manner
contrary to the designed and normal operational purpose for the component, including, but not
limited to, varying the pull of the handle of a slot machine, with knowledge that the manipulation
affects the outcome of the game or with knowledge of any event that affects the outcome of the
game.
,5Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 337 (Nev. 1998). Additionally, NEV. REV. STAT. 465.088
provided, in pertinent part:
(1) A person who violates any provision of NRS 465.070 to 465.085, inclusive, is guilty of a
category B felony and shall be punished:
(a) For the first offense, by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less
than I year and a maximum term of not more than 6 years, or by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or by both fine and imprisonment ....
16 Oade, 960 P.2d at 337.
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.... 7 In the second instance, "he thought he had been paid on his first bet
and was attempting to place a second bet."'
' 8
The trial judge's conduct during Oade's trial was erratic and disruptive.
Indeed, throughout the trial, the judge seemed to be preoccupied with the
behavior of Oade's counsel.' 9 At an early point during the trial, Oade's coun-
sel moved for a mistrial because the court's "attitude" toward him seemed
improper.2 ° The court responded abruptly to the motion, interrupting Oade's
counsel, and denied the motion. 2 ' After dismissing the jury, the trial judge
admonished Oade's counsel that he would not "be provoked into a mistrial."22
On numerous other occasions, the judge "expressed his impatience with
Oade's counsel in the presence of the jury. 23 Additionally, the judge offered
his opinion regarding the evidence and discussed issues wholly unrelated to the
case. 24 At one point, after Oade's counsel had cross-examined "a state gaming
agent regarding blackjack rules," 25 the judge addressed the jury as follows:
There is no regulation or rule which permits a person to increase the bet after the bet
has been made and the cards dealt unless it is a situation where it's known as a
double down . . . or you split cards. But in my view, this examination borders on
illogical. If [Oade's counsel] is trying to suggest that you have a right to double the
bet when the cards are favorable to you just because you like the cards, that is not
the law. Those are not the rules.
26
Moreover, the judge expressed his opinion that Oade's defense theory -
that he was intoxicated while gambling - was unsustainable.2 7 The judge also
assessed repeated "fines against or issued warnings to Oade's counsel for minor
transgressions, such as injecting argument into his opening statement and call-
ing his own client by his first name." 28
The jury, like the judge, did not accept Oade's defense and found him
guilty.29 On appeal, Oade argued that the district court judge's comments,
repeated threats, and imposition of fines were inappropriate and had a prejudi-
cial effect on the jury's ability to gauge the credibility of his defense.30 Thus,
Oade argued, the judge's comments and other inappropriate conduct substan-
tially affected his right to a fair trial.3 ' The Nevada Supreme Court agreed. 32
It concluded "that the district court judge's conduct, when considered in its
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 338.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 339.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 /d.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 337.
31 Id. at 338.
32 Id.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
entirety, constituted cumulative error, which may have prejudiced Oade's right
to a fair trial."3 3
Justice Shearing, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the judgment
below should have been affirmed.3 4 Justice Shearing opined that the district
court's admonitions of Oade's counsel were made in an effort "to focus on the
relevant issues, avoid inappropriate argument and prevent counsel from repeat-
ing questions or arguing after objections were sustained. '3 5 While finding that
the district court judge's comments relating to the rules of blackjack were
"potentially prejudicial," Justice Shearing stated that the judge's comments
could not have prejudiced Oade because later testimony effectively cleared up
any disagreement that may have existed regarding the rules.36
Also dissenting, Justice Maupin indicated that he regretted the trial judge's
conduct, but stated that, because the evidence overwhelmingly suggested the
defendant's guilt, the conduct was harmless.37 In sum, the dissent opined that
the district court judge's comments were harmless.
III. RULES RELATING TO JUDICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE EVIDENCE
The rules governing whether a trial judge may comment on the evidence
evolved from the English common law and now differ greatly from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction.38 The common law and American federal courts generally per-
mit commentary relating to the evidence.3 9 Nonetheless, "the majority of state
courts forbid it." 4 °
A. English Common Law
Through the years, English common law has strictly limited the judge's
ability to manipulate jury deliberations.4 ' Intriguingly, however, the English
common law has preserved the judge's right to persuade the jury by comment-
ing on the evidence.4 2 This right included the "power to... express an opinion
33 Id.
31 Id. (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 340-41.
36 Id. at 340.
31 Id. at 340-4 1. Justice Shearing's reasoning in dissent is effectively a harmless error anal-
ysis. In essence, she argues that the judge's comments were harmless, given that later testi-
mony effectively overrode any prejudice caused by them.
38 Id.
39 Laura Braden Foster, Note, Nobles v. Casebier and Judicial Comments on the Evidence
in Arkansas, 51 ARK. L. REV. 801, 804-11 (1998). Some of the background material for this
Part was taken from Foster's case note, and, therefore, is attributed to her. Additional simi-
larity between her note and this presentation are the result of using many of the same back-
ground resources.
40 Id. at 804.
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 408 (1996). Here, the author explained Bushell's Case, 124 Eng.
Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), which forbade English judges from punishing jurors for rendering
verdicts that were not in line with the judge's view of the case. Smith stated:
This case established the independence of the English jury and cemented its position as a guaran-
tor of liberty in the face of state oppression. After Bushell's Case, judges could no longer punish
[Vol. 3:572
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concerning the credibility of witnesses."4 3 Not only could common law judges
comment upon the evidence, but they could also direct how and when evidence
was presented for the jury's review.' Thus, English common law did not for-
bid direct persuasion of jurors by a common law judge;45 rather, it encouraged
it.46 One theory explaining why common law judges were permitted, even
encouraged, to comment on the evidence is that, since they had originally been
granted license to compel juries to resolve a case in the manner that the judge
desired, "the lesser power of using persuasion to influence the jury could not by
comparison be problematic. 47
A judge's power to comment on the evidence continues today under mod-
ern English common law.48 In fact, not only are today's common law judges
permitted to comment on the evidence, they are obligated to present to the jury
a succinct but accurate summary of the issues of fact as to which a decision is
required, a correct but concise summary of the evidence and arguments on both sides,
and a correct statement of the inferences which the jury are [sic] entitled to draw
from their particular conclusions about the primary facts.
49
Even so, that power is not boundless: the common law judge must still
indicate to the jury that they are not bound to accept the judge's opinion regard-
ing the evidence presented or his interpretation thereof.50
the jury for its verdict, but could set aside verdicts and grant new trials based upon procedural or
evidentiary error.
Smith, supra.
43 Id.
'4 Id. at 408-09 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 375 (University of Chicago Press 1979) (1769); 1 MAT-rHEW HALE, THE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 291 (4th ed. 1792)); see also Austin Wakeman Scott,
Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 680 (1918), stating:
At common law it was clearly proper for the judge not merely to state the law and to sum up the
evidence, but also to express an opinion on the questions of fact in issue as long as he leaves to
the jury the ultimate determination of the issue, and makes it clear that it is not bound to adopt
his opinion as its own.
45 Smith, supra note 41, at 408-09.
46 Id. at 409.
47 Id. Smith noted:
The utility of judicial commentary was said to be found in the greater experience of the judge in
observing the testimony of witnesses and weighing the evidence before him. According to one
early commentator, the judge was able "in matters of fact to give [the jury] great light and
assistance by his weighing the evidence before them, and by shewing them his opinion even in a
matter of fact." Thus, the use of this persuasive power of the judge over members of the jury
was justified on the grounds that it might lead to more accurate factfinding by the jury. The
judge represented a valuable source of information since he had experience listening to testi-
mony and receiving evidence in many different cases, whereas the experience of the members of
the jury was more limited. Although early English jurors may not have been onetime partici-
pants in the system (like modem jurors), and may have had prior trial experience, they certainly
were not as experienced as the trial judge.
Id. (citing HALE, supra note 43, at 291).
1 Smith, supra note 41, at 410.
49 Id.
50 Id. (quoting Regina v. Lawrence, 73 Crim. App. 1, 5 (1981) (Lord Hailsham)).
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B. American Federal Courts
The English common law practice of commenting on the evidence "was
one that, under the Constitution, descended to and has been more or less main-
tained by federal courts."'', Trial judges presiding over American federal
courts enjoy many of the same rights, privileges, and powers that English com-
mon law judges maintain in conducting trials, including the power to comment
on the evidence. 5' That power, however, has been severely limited in Ameri-
can federal courts.53
In Quercia v. United States,54 the United States Supreme Court narrowed
the traditional common law rule permitting trial judges to comment on the evi-
dence. The trial judge in Quercia, after instructing the jury regarding the gov-
erning law surrounding the case, declared to the jury that he believed the
defendant's testimony to be false merely because he wiped his hands during his
testimony.55 The judge attempted to mitigate the effects of his statement by
instructing the jury that his opinion of the evidence was not binding upon
them,5 6 and that, if the jury members did not agree with his interpretation of the
evidence, they were to find the defendant not guilty.57 After his conviction, the
defendant took exception to this charge as infringing upon his right to a fair
trial.58
In "the most comprehensive modern opinion from the Supreme Court on
this subject,"59 the United States Supreme Court stated:
This privilege of the judge to comment on the facts has its inherent limitations. His
discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to be exercised in conformity
with the standards of governing the judicial office. In commenting upon testimony
he may not assume the role of a witness. He may analyze and dissect the evidence,
but he may not either distort it or add to it. His privilege of comment in order to give
appropriate assistance to the jury is too important to be left without safeguards
against abuses. The influence of the trial judge on the jury "is necessarily and prop-
erly of great weight" and "his lightest word or intimation is received with deference,
and may prove controlling." This court has accordingly emphasized the duty of the
trial judge to use great care that an expression of opinion upon the evidence "should
51 Scott, supra note 43, at 680.
52 United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 1996). See also Vicksburg & Meridian
R.R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469
(1933).
53 Filani, 74 F.3d. at 383.
54 Id. at 383-84.
55 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
56 Id. at 468-69. The judge stated:
And now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant's testimony. You may have
noticed, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is rather a
curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying. Why it should be so we don't
know, but that is the fact. I think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed
with the Government's testimony, was a lie.
Id.
51 Id. at 469 ("Now, that opinion is an opinion of evidence and is not binding on you, and if
you don't agree with it, it is your duty to find him not guilty.").
58 Id. Note that the judges remarks here, effectively "washing his own hands clean" of any
error, is a tactic that would have permitted the statements at common law. See Smith, supra
note 46.
19 Quercia, 289 U.S. at 468-69.
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be so given as not to mislead, and especially that it should not be one-sided"; that
"deductions and theories not warranted by the evidence should be studiously
avoided."6 °
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge had improperly
interjected his own opinion as if it were factual evidence presented during the
trial, thus prejudicing the defendant's right to a fair trial. 6 ' The trial judge had
not analyzed the evidence, or merely presented it to the jury, but in fact had
added to it and "based his instruction upon his own addition. 62
Quercia identified certain factors to which courts should look when ana-
lyzing whether improper judicial comments warrant reversal.63 These have
been outlined as: (1) "whether the judge assumed the role of a witness by either
distorting or adding to the evidence; 64 (2) "whether the judge was one-sided or
partisan;" 65 (3) "whether the judge undercut either the accused's privilege to
testify or to call witnesses on his own behalf or the jury's ability to find the
facts and determine credibility; 66 (4) "whether the judge's conduct was coer-
cive, in that it influenced the verdict;"67 and (5) "whether the impropriety was
cured by the judge's subsequent instructions to the jury."68
While these factors continue to appear in federal case law, Quercia failed
to provide a bright-line constitutional test "that can be applied readily to claims
of improper judicial behavior. 69 Rather, the case serves as a description of a
federal trial court judge's role, and is, therefore, not binding on state courts.70
C. State Courts
The decline of the English common law tradition of allowing and even
encouraging trial judges to comment on the evidence began early in the Ameri-
can colonies.7 One of the main reasons for the decline was the distrust felt by
60 A. Sherman Christensen, Comment on the Evidence as a Vital Part of the Common Law
Charge to the Jury, 44 F.R.D. 310, 310 (1946).
61 Quercia, 289 U.S. at 470 (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894);
Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 421-23 (18961). The court also stated:
It is within the [trial judge's] province, whenever he thinks it necessary, to assist the jury in
arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and commenting upon the evidence, by drawing their
attention to the parts of it which he thinks important, and he may express his opinion upon the
facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their
determination.
Id. Interestingly, the court held that the trial judge's comments in this case were improper,
despite his instruction that his statements did not bind the jury members. Apparently there is
a subtle distinction between expressing one's opinion on the evidence and actually adding to
the evidence, as was held herein. This distinction is not pursued here, however.
62 Id. at 471-72.
63 Id. at 471.
64 See Emily Wheeler, The Constitutional Right to a Trial Before a Neutral Judge: Federal-
ism Tips the Balance Against State Habeas Petitioners, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 872-73
(1985).
65 Id. at 872.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 872-73.
69 Id. at 873.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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bar members and the general public towards colonial judges.72 Colonial judges
often lacked formal training in the law and were widely regarded throughout
the American colonies as "puppets of the crown."'73 Consequently, the nascent
state legislatures soon began "curbing the power of judges by, among other
things, taking away their right to comment on the evidence. 7 4
In 1796, North Carolina became the first state to forbid judges from
expressing "any opinion as to whether a fact was fully or sufficiently
proved."'75 Tennessee soon followed suit, including a provision in its constitu-
tion that provided, "Judges of the inferior and the superior courts shall not
charge juries with respect to matters of facts, but may state the testimony and
declare the law."7 6 As new states began entering the Union, many of them
based their own constitutions on that of Tennessee, as it was widely regarded at
the time as a model constitution.77 Indeed, Nevada's constitution also imitates
the language of Tennessee's constitution, with provisions virtually identical to
those of Tennessee, in stating: "Judges shall not charge juries in respect to
matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law. ' 78 By 1913,
nearly every state had enacted a law prohibiting judges from commenting upon
the evidence.7 9
IV. THE RULE OF HARMLESS ERROR
Nevada has adopted the rule of harmless error." The rule is set forth as
follows:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in
any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 8 1
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that this rule applies where judges
have violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against commenting
on the evidence.8 2 The Federal version of the rule of harmless error is identical
to its Nevada counterpart8 3 and likewise "is applicable to conduct in the court-
room. It has been applied to excessive conversation between the judge and
72 Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on
the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 164
(1988).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 164-65.
77 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 9. See Foster, supra note 38, at 811.
78 Foster, supra note 38, at 811 (citing Johnson, supra note 75, at 77 nn.5-10).
79 NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
80 Foster, supra note 38, at 811.
8I See NEV. R. Civ. P. 61. While no comparable criminal statute exists, the rule of harmless
error is unquestionably utilized in the criminal context.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Twin Lakes Riding Stable, Inc., 500 P.2d 572, 573 (Nev. 1972).
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counsel, and to remarks made by the trial judge in connection with the charge
to the jury."84
In application, the rule of harmless error obligates courts to evaluate
alleged violations, but ignore all errors or defects that do "not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties" 8 5 The rule stems from the common notion that
"[n]o one is entitled to a perfect trial."86 The inherent imperfections of the
people who created, and now administer, the judicial system, make any attempt
at a perfect trial impossible.87 Consequently, fairness is the ultimate goal in
today's judicial system because, as one commentator noted, "[A] fair trial, as
opposed to a perfect trial, is the best our system of justice can offer."88
The rule of harmless error thus evolved as a reaction to the imperfections
that flourish in trials throughout the judicial system. 89 Because of the social
and economic costs associated with re-trying cases on appeal due to minor
imperfections during the original trial, this rule emerged as a means to mitigate
the cost of such reversals.9" Unfortunately, however, the development of the
doctrine of harmless error may have unintentionally promoted misconduct on
the part of prosecutors and judges, who now may weigh their chances that "the
appellate courts will ignore the misconduct."'" Ironically, the effect of the rule
of harmless error may have resulted in an increased number of appeals involv-
ing judicial misconduct by improper commentary on the evidence.9 2
V. JUDICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE EVIDENCE IN NEVADA
Nevada follows the majority of states that forbid trial judges from com-
menting on the evidence. Article I, section 12 of the Nevada Constitution
states: "Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact ...."" The
Nevada legislature has also forbidden trial judges from commenting on the evi-
dence. Section 3.230 of Nevada Revised Statutes states, in part: "In stating the
evidence, the judge should not comment upon the probability or improbability
84 FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
85 7 JAMES WM. MOORE & Jo DESHA LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 61.08 (2d ed.
1993) (citations omitted).
86 NEV. R. Civ. P. 61.
87 Denise M. Faehnrich, The "Harm" in the Application of the "Harmless Error" Doctrine
to the Constitutional Defect in In Re C.V., 44 S.D. L. REV. 340, 366 (1999) (citing Kot-
teakos v. Unites States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946)).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 367.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Bennet L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 393, 425 (1992). See
also Tara J. Tobin, Note, Miscarriage of Justice During Closing Arguments By An Overzeal-
ous Prosecutor and a Timid Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. REV. 186, 224-25
(2000).
9' Cf Tobin, supra note 91, at 224-25 (citations omitted), wherein the author postulates:
This increased number of appeals involving prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is
due in large part to the expanded use of this doctrine. Recognizing the effect of this doctrine,
prosecutors are essentially "unleash[ed] ... from the restraining threat of appellate reversal."
Predicting that a reviewing court will apply the harmless error doctrine, prosecutors increasingly
use improper trial tactics during closing arguments.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
of its truth nor the credibility thereof."94 The Nevada Supreme Court has
expressly held that violations of these provisions may require a new trial95
where the violations are not harmless to a party's substantial right to a fair
trial.96
A. Nevada Case Law
The earliest Nevada case dealing with a trial judge's improper comments
regarding evidence is Peterson v. Pittsburg Silver Peak Gold Mining Co.97
While the Peterson Court did not grant a new trial based on the trial judge's
improper comments,9 8 this case nonetheless laid the foundation of rules and
policies governing improper judicial commentary on the evidence.99 The court
clearly stated its disdain for unnecessary commentary by trial judges and cau-
tioned judges against doing so:
While it is true that not every remark of the trial court will constitute reversible error,
where it is made with reference to the admissibility of evidence, yet there is nothing
of which a nisi prius judge should be more careful than in his remarks or assertions
made with reference to admitted or rejected testimony during the course of a trial.
The average juror is a layman; the average layman looks with most profound respect
to the presiding judge; and the jury is, as a rule, alert to any remark that will indicate
favor or disfavor on the part of the trial judge. Human opinion is oft times formed
upon circumstances meager and insignificant in their outward appearance; and the
words and utterances of a trial judge, sitting with a jury in attendance, is liable,
however unintentional, to mould the opinion of the members of the jury to the extent
that one or the other side of the controversy may be prejudiced or injured thereby. 10 0
Since Peterson, the Nevada Supreme Court has periodically been faced
with deciding whether or not a trial judge's comments on the evidence war-
ranted a new trial. Unfortunately, the court has not announced any bright-line
test for determining which comments amount to reversible error and which
comments do not. Thus, the scope of Nevada's constitutional and statutory
prohibitions against judicial comments on the evidence has not been defined.'
Nonetheless, until Oade,' ° 2 each of the cases in which the Nevada
Supreme Court ordered a new trial for improper comments, the court evaluated
the comments in light of the rule of harmless error and held that the improper
9' NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
9 NEV. REV. STAT. 3.230 (2001).
96 See Peterson v. Pittsburg Silver Peak Gold Mining Co., 140 P. 519, 521 (Nev. 1914)
(requiring new trial where trial judge made "[pirejudicial statements and remarks ... during
the course of the trial"); Wheeler v. Twin Lakes Riding Stable, Inc., 500 P.2d 572 (Nev.
1972) (requiring new trial where "the district court impermissibly commented upon the evi-
dence by jury instruction .... "); Gordon v. Hurtado, 541 P.2d 533 (Nev. 1975) (holding
"trial court's comment on the quality and quantity of the direct evidence" and "referring to
the inadmissible testimony" of a witness as "particularly appropriate and particularly proba-
tive" as warranting new trial).
97 Wheeler, 500 P.2d at 573.
98 140 P. 519 (Nev. 1914).
99 Id. at 521.
'oo See id. at 520-21.
101 Id. at 521.
102 Cf Foster, supra note 38, at 816 (stating that the Arkansas Supreme Court has similarly
failed to define "the parameters of the constitutional prohibition").
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comments were not harmless.' 0 3 A review of these cases provides insight into
the types of judicial commentary that may be deemed so improper as to require
a new trial.
1. Improper Comments Warranting a New Trial
The following Nevada decisions reveal that a new trial is generally
required when judicial commentary is inconsistent with the established evi-
dence, or relates to subjects not supported by the evidence. For example, when
a trial court has determined that issues of fact remain for the jury's considera-
tion on any given claim, the court should not thereafter state that the evidence
is insufficient to support that claim."
In Wheeler v. Twin Lakes Riding Stable, Inc.,' °5 the Nevada Supreme
Court held that a fair trial cannot occur where a trial judge comments upon the
evidence, "by jury instruction or otherwise," after having determined that the
issue must be resolved by a jury.'0 6 There, the appellant fell from a rented
horse when he ran into "an overhanging tree branch while riding down a trail
under the control of the respondent-defendant from whom he had rented the
horse."' 0 7 The appellant argued at trial that the respondent-defendant failed to
wam him of the horse's dangerous propensities and failed to adequately main-
tain the trail on which the appellant was riding.'0 8 When the presentation of
evidence closed, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the judge
denied.' 09 "Apparently, the court believed that the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom ... presented a jury question."' " Nonetheless, by way of
jury instruction, the court commented to the jury that there was insufficient
evidence to prove negligence, at least regarding the horse's dangerous
tendencies. ''
Citing Nevada's constitutional' 12 and statutory' prohibitions against
judicial comments on the evidence, the Nevada Supreme Court stated, "[the]
barrier between court and jury preserves their respective functions and insures
freedom in the jury to decide facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom
without influence or direction from the court except as to applicable law."' '14
13 Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336 (Nev. 1998).
'04 See Wheeler v. Twin Lakes Riding Stable, Inc., 500 P.2d 572, 573 (Nev. 1972); Gordon
v. Hurtado, 541 P.2d 533, 535-36 (Nev. 19.75).
105 See Wheeler, 500 P.2d at 573.
106 Id.
107 Id.
1o8 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I" Id.
112 Id. The challenged instruction read as follows:
There has not been sufficient evidence adduced during the course of this trial upon which this
jury could base a determination or finding of negligence of the defendant by virtue of any inher-
ent propensities of the horse to act in an erratic manner. Therefore, there has been insufficient
evidence to find that the defendant corporation was negligent by virtue of having failed to inform
the plaintiff of any propensities of the horse behaving in an erratic manner.
Id. at 573 n.2.
113 NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
114 NEV. REV. STAT. 3.230 (2001).
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Because the trial judge had violated the pertinent prohibitions, the Supreme
Court evaluated the violations in light of the rule of harmless error.' '" The
court could not conclude, however, that the judge's comments were harmless
because "[o]ne half of the plaintiff's claim of negligence was removed from
jury consideration."' 16 Furthermore, any closing argument presented by plain-
tiff's counsel was, as a result of the improper instruction, "concomitantly cur-
tailed."' 7 Consequently, a new trial was ordered.'' 8
Similarly, judicial comments that speak to a witness's qualifications or
commend a witness for offering what the trial judge believes to be an impres-
sive testimony are prohibited, particularly when the witness's testimony is
inadmissible.'9 Such was the case in Gordon v. Hurtado.120 There, after
denying appellant's motion to exclude the testimony of a traffic reconstruction
analyst, whose testimony should not have been admitted, 12 the trial judge
stated the following in the presence of the jury:
The court is substantially impressed in this case not only by the qualification of this
witness and the validity to formulate opinions enunciated by him, but also by the fact
there was virtually no direct testimony whatsoever to assist or aid or direct testimony
whatsoever to assist or aid or direct or guide the jury with regard to circumstances
surrounding the accident in concluding that in this case the testimony in the line of
accident construction is particularly appropriate and particularly probative and, there-
fore, more than justified on the basis of the record before the court at this time.
12 2
Again citing the constitutional and statutory prohibitions, the Nevada
Supreme Court held that the trial judge's statement was improper because he
directly commented on the evidence before the jury and also improperly spoke
to the witness's credibility. 123 Like the comments made in Wheeler, the trial
judge's remarks here did not withstand scrutiny under the harmless error
rule. 124 Quoting Wheeler, the court held that a fair trial could not have
occurred in this case and remanded for a new trial.
125
Interestingly, the issue of improper judicial comments was addressed in
Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp.,126 two years prior to the Wheeler decision. In
Ginnis, the Nevada Supreme Court disapproved of several inappropriate
remarks made by the trial court judge. 127 These included inappropriate com-
ments "on the credibility of expert witnesses and on testimony," as well as
offering remarks which were unrelated to the court's rulings.' 2 8 Notwithstand-
ing its disapproval of the judge's comments, the Nevada Supreme Court chose
not to decide the prejudicial effects of such remarks because counsel for appel-
''5 Wheeler, 500 P.2d at 573.
116 Id.
117 Id.
11S Id.
119 Id.
120 Gordon v. Hurtado, 541 P.2d 533, 534-35 (Nev. 1975).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 535.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 536.
126 Id.
127 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970).
128 Id. at 141.
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lant failed to preserve the issue for appeal.129 Even so, Ginnis constitutes addi-
tional evidence that Nevada does not tolerate inappropriate comments on the
credibility of expert witnesses, or remarks that distract from the evidence
presented.
The Nevada Supreme Court has also held that when a jury instruction
inappropriately comments on the evidence, it is not error for the trial court to
refuse it.13 0 In In re Peterson's Estate,'31 the trial court refused the following
jury instruction:
The probability that a guided signature can be written by a feeble hand without a
tremor or without interruptions and violent variations is very remote and adverse to
experience. Arbitrary angles or eratic [sic] pen strokes may be certain evidence of
the testator's resistance, indicating that the unwilling hand had been forced to write
by the stronger guiding hand. Such factor would show the element of control, and
not the genuine signature of the testator. 
132
Without much analysis, the Nevada Supreme Court refused to find error
with the trial court refusing this instruction because "it was an improper com-
ment on the evidence."' 133
2. Comments Not Warranting a New Trial
Nevada cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to order new trials
where trial judges made improper comments on the evidence far outnumber
those in which new trials were granted. Generally, each of these courts based
their refusal to grant a new trial on one of the following theories: (1) the com-
ments constituted the judge's opinion formed during trial, but were expressed
after the jury had rendered its verdict; 134 (2) the comments, while improper,
were harmless under the harmless error rule;' 3 5 or (3) the comments did not
constitute commentary on the facts because they were not made in a "charge"
to the jury. 136
Evans v. State' 37 is an example of the first category of cases where a trial
judge's comments may have been improper had they actually been expressed
during the trial. Evans held that a trial judge's comments made in a written
opinion after the case had concluded did not prejudice the appellant's right to a
fair trial. 138 Concerning the losing party, the judge wrote:
129 Id. at 140.
130 Id. at 141. Note, however, that in Parodi v. Washoe Medical Center, Inc., 892 P.2d 588
(Nev. 1995), the Supreme Court of Nevada held "that the failure to object will not always
preclude appellate review in instances where judicial deportment is of an inappropriate but
non-egregious and repetitive nature that becomes prejudicial when considered in its
entirety." Id. at 591. Thus, the failure to object to judicial misconduct will not necessarily
preclude a determination that the trial judge's inappropriate comments on the evidence
prejudiced a litigant's right to a fair trial.
131 In re Peterson's Estate, 360 P.2d 259, 272 (Nev. 1961).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See Evans v. Dorman, 402 P.2d 652, 655 (Nev. 1965).
136 See Pertgen v. State, 774 P.2d 429, 431-32 (Nev. 1989); Barrett v. State, 776 P.2d 538,
541 (Nev. 1989).
137 See Barrett, 776 P.2d at 541; Shannon v. State, 783 P.2d 942, 945-46 (Nev. 1989).
138 402 P.2d 652 (Nev. 1965).
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Miss Evans is an arrogant, haughty, irrepressible person. She has little ability to see
the truth when it doesn't suit her purpose and will say anything that suits her whim of
the moment or to accomplish her objectives. She is a matriarch who demands that
she rule and none, in her opinion, should dare encroach upon what she considers as
her prerogatives. 139
While these comments might have constituted improper commentary on
the evidence had the trial judge made the remarks during trial, the comments
were held to be of no consequence since the statement was merely "the candid
observation of one charged with the duty of decision."' 40
Pertgen v. State"4 ' and Barrett v. State'4 2 are illustrative of the second
variety of cases which, while not condoning a trial judge's comments, have
held that the comments constituted harmless error. For example, improper
comments made in the presence of the jury may, in fact, be cured if the trial
judge later explains to the jury the context of his or her comments.' 4 3 In
Pertgen, the trial judge, during voir dire proceedings, responded as follows to a
prospective juror who knew one of the State's witnesses and expressed her
willingness to believe that witness:
I am not suggesting [the witness] is not going to be telling the truth because she is
going to be telling the truth. There is no question about that. But what I am saying is
she is one of the witnesses in the case. Would you put undue emphasis more on her
testimony than on somebody else's testimony?144
Later, the judge explained to the selected jury before Pertgen moved for a
mistrial that what he
[m]eant to say by that statement was that [the witness] would be sworn under oath
and would be sworn to tell the truth, as all the witnesses would. But as to whether or
not, in fact, you want to believe that testimony, it is up to you to decide. You make
the determination as regarding the credibility of any witness that testifies. 145
Evaluating the alleged constitutional and statutory violations in light of the
harmless error rule, 146 the court held that, because the judge had made an effort
to cure his mistake by way of his "subsequent explanation and instruction to the
jury," the comment was harmless and would not require a new trial.' 47
Similarly, potentially prejudicial remarks made by a trial judge constitute
harmless error, nearly by definition, when the appellant cannot demonstrate that
any prejudice resulted therefrom.'48 Thus, in Barrett v. State,149 the Nevada
Supreme Court refused to find that a trial judge's remarks prejudiced the appel-
lant's right to a fair trial when the appellant "failed to demonstrate any
prejudice." '50
139 Id. at 655.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 774 P.2d 429 (Nev. 1989).
143 776 P.2d 538 (Nev. 1989).
1' Pertgen, 774 P.2d at 431-32.
145 Id. at 431.
146 id.
147 Id. at 432.
148 Id.
149 Barrett v. State, 776 P.2d 538, 541 (Nev. 1989).
150 1,4
[Vol. 3:572
Spring 2003] JUDICIAL COMMENTARY AND HARMLESS ERROR 587
Barrett's refusal to grant a new trial also exemplifies the third variety of
cases which have refused to grant new trials for improper comments on the
evidence: those in which the comments were not made while "charging" the
jury. 15 1 In Barrett, a witness testified that she had overheard the wife of the
defendant accused of murder state, "I wish I wouldn't of did it."' 152 When
"[o]n cross-examination, the prosecution asked if the witness knew what [the
defendant's wife] wished she had not done," the defense objected to the ques-
tion. ' 53 However, before the court ruled on the objection, the witness stated, "I
think she was talking about the murder."'' 54 The trial court belatedly sustained
the objection, but declared, "I don't know if we're going to be able to erase the
obvious conclusion that is unsupported by any facts of what this witness has
volunteered." 155
In a curious, but very technical application of Article 6, section 12 of the
Nevada Constitution and NEVADA REVISED STATUTE 3.230, which prohibit a
judge from commenting on evidence, the court held that neither provision was
applicable in this case because the judge "was not 'charging' the jury." 156
Thus, the court held that the appellant "was fairly tried and convicted
below." 157
Shannon v. State' 58 also serves as an example of the rule that a judge's
comments may not require a new trial when they are not made as part of a
"charge" to the jury. 159 There, the Nevada Supreme Court distinguished
instances where a trial court improperly charges the jury as to facts and those
where a court merely states the evidence.'16 Shannon did not warrant a new
trial because the judge's comments "were made during the course of formulat-
ing a hypothetical question for the expert witness," and were made during a
conversation between the court and defense counsel "in order to settle properly
a hypothetical posed to the expert witness, not as a comment on the facts.'
16 1
B. Analysis and Discussion of Oade v. State
Taking into consideration Nevada case law, Oade reveals a number of
procedural defects in the Nevada Supreme Court's analysis of improper com-
ments on the evidence. The Nevada Supreme Court in Oade appears to have
reached the correct result, ordering a new trial based on the judge's improper
remarks regarding the rules of blackjack and his assertion that the defense's
theory of the case was untenable. ' 62 But the court reached its decision through
a means inconsistent with the established law. First and foremost, the court did
not evaluate the judge's comments on the evidence in light of the applicable
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 ld.
159 783 P.2d 942 (Nev. 1989).
160 Id. at 945-46.
161 Id. at 946.
162 Id.
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constitutional 163 and statutory"' prohibitions against commentary on the evi-
dence. Second, had the court addressed the constitutional and statutory
prohibitions, it then should have analyzed the comments in light of the rule of
harmless error, as prior courts had done. However, instead of following estab-
lished precedent, Oade cumulatively analyzed the trial judge's comments and
conduct using a "potentially prejudicial" analysis. While this deflated standard
might arguably be appropriate, given that the Nevada Supreme Court looked at
the entirety of the misconduct in concluding that it was plain error because it
was "potentially prejudicial," this standard could prove to be a thorn in the
Nevada Supreme Court's side if interpreted as the necessary analysis of
improper judicial commentary on the evidence. So interpreted, this standard
might unnecessarily and inadvertently increase the chances that a trial judge's
comments will require a new trial. Such a result is inconsistent with judicial
economy, litigants' rights to a fair and speedy trial, and, in civil cases," 65 the
intent of the rules of civil procedure. 166
Article VI, section 12 of the Nevada Constitution and NEVADA REVISED
STATUTE 3.230 expressly prohibit judicial comments on the evidence. In Oade,
the judge's remarks on the rules of blackjack, 167 and his implication that
"Oade's voluntary intoxication defense was untenable,"' 68 clearly fall within
the scope of these prohibitions. The Nevada Supreme Court condemned the
comments:
It was improper for the judge to expand on his reasons for sustaining objections and
to comment on the strength of the defense's theory. In doing so, the judge injected
into the proceedings his belief as to the merits of Mr. Oade's defense
The above errors were individually neither prejudicial nor egregious; however,
viewed in their entirety, they were clearly erroneous and potentially prejudicial to
Oade's case.
* . .The judge's remarks may have lessened the defense's credibility and prevented
the defense from obtaining full and fair consideration from the jury. We therefore,
conclude that the judge's remarks may have had a prejudicial impact on the verdict
and thus constitute plain error warranting reversal.
169
Like Wheeler v. Twin Lakes Riding Stable, Inc., 7 ' the trial judge in Oade
prejudiced the defense's right to a fair trial by commenting on the presented
evidence and suggesting that the defense could not prove its case. Surely, a
163 Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 339 (1998).
'c4 NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
65 NEV. REV. STAT. 3.230 (2001).
166 While Oade is a criminal case, the rule of harmless error, as provided by NEv. R. Civ. P.
61, no doubt, applies equally.
167 See NEV. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating, in part, "[The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."). See
also U.S. Const. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (2003).
168 Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 339 (Nev. 1998).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 339-40 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). It also appears from the
opinion that the Nevada Supreme Court took into account other remarks by the trial judge,
many of which did not constitute commentary on the evidence, but rather fell under another
category of judicial misconduct addressed in this note. The cumulative effect of the judge's
comments on the evidence and his expression of impatience with Oade's counsel required a
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jury hearing such words from a judge would take them to heart and possibly
side with the judge, regardless of the basis for the remarks. 17 ' Given the preju-
dicial nature of the judge's comments, the inquiry should then have turned to
whether the judge's remarks were harmless in light of other considerations,
such as the extent of the evidence and whether a party has satisfied its burden
of proof. There can be little doubt that any remark by a judge relating to the
presented evidence weighs heavily in a lay juror's personal evaluation of the
evidence, and may be potentially prejudicial to a party's case. But "potentially
prejudicial" is not the applicable standard. Actual prejudice to a party's sub-
stantial rights must first have occurred before a new trial can be ordered.
Despite this, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the decision of the dis-
trict court and remanded for a new trial based on a "potentially prejudicial"
standard. The Nevada Supreme Court's analysis was not confined to the
judge's comments on the evidence alone, its opinion including analysis of the
judge's other inappropriate conduct. However, the Nevada Supreme Court
nonetheless based its reversal on a standard that did not truly reflect whether
Oade's substantive rights had been violated, a showing required under Nevada
law to support a new trial. The most obvious explanation for the Nevada
Supreme Court's deviation from its prior precedents is its failure to recognize
anywhere in its opinion that the judge's comments violated either the constitu-
tional or statutory prohibitions against commenting on the evidence. Previous
decisions of the same court, as noted above, clearly hold that any violation of
the constitutional or statutory prohibitions against improper commentary should
be followed with a harmless error analysis.' 7 2 Further, the fact that Oade is a
criminal case does not, of itself, damage that result. Thus, in adverse deviation
from precedent, the Nevada Supreme Court altered the long-established stan-
dard of review in cases where such violations exist by holding that the remarks
were "clearly erroneous and potentially prejudicial."' 7 3
Requiring a new trial because remarks may have potentially prejudiced a
case is significantly different than requiring a new trial because the remarks
were not harmless. Potentially prejudicial remarks, by definition, do not
require a showing of actual prejudice. Rather, "potentially prejudicial" only
requires a showing that remarks may have been prejudicial to an inequitable
extent. To allow a new trial where a party may not have actually been
prejudiced does not comport with the goals of judicial efficiency and the fair
and speedy resolution of legal actions.
Requiring a new trial when a judge's comments potentially prejudice a
case is wholly inconsistent with established Nevada law.' 74 As noted above,
new trial in this case. Id. Note also here that even the court's "plain error" conclusion does
not require actual prejudice.
171 500 P.2d 572 (Nev. 1972).
172 See Oade, 960 P.2d at 339, stating:
It must be remembered that "the words and utterances of a trial judge, sitting with a jury in
attendance, are liable, however unintentional, to mold the opinion of the members of the jury to
the extent that one or the other side of the controversy may be prejudiced or injured thereby."
(citations omitted).
3 See, e.g., Wheeler, 500 P.2d at 573.
174 Oade, 960 P.2d at 339.
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Barrett v. State held that a litigant could not claim to have been deprived of a
fair trial when, in fact, the litigant was unable to demonstrate that any prejudice
resulted from improper comments.' 7 5 In Oade, it is clear that, given the nature
of the judge's comments, the Barrett standard probably could have been satis-
fied; that is, Oade might well have shown, under the proper analysis, that the
judge's comments were, in fact, prejudicial. Under Oade's potentially prejudi-
cial standard, however, a new trial might be ordered when a litigant cannot
demonstrate that actual prejudice resulted from a judge's improper comments.
Litigants, under the Oade standard, would merely be required to show that the
judge's comments could have prejudiced the right to a fair trial. Such a result
is inconsistent with Barrett.
Additionally, the Oade standard, if followed, may have unfortunate effects
on appellate practice in Nevada. Adherence to a "potentially prejudicial" stan-
dard could increase the number of appeals filed in cases where a litigant's
rights have not been substantially prejudiced. Litigants would not be required
to demonstrate actual prejudice under the Oade standard, but would merely
have to show that their right to a fair trial might have been prejudiced. Liti-
gants would thus have a better chance for a new trial on appeal and be willing
to test the appellate waters. Logically, these results lead to a larger appellate
docket, longer waiting periods for case resolution, and, ultimately, higher costs
for litigants, their attorneys, and the court.
Conversely, the rule of harmless error requires a litigant to show that the
substantial right to a fair trial has been actually prejudiced before granting a
new trial.' 76 While not every unseemly comment made by a trial judge will
qualify as improper and require reversal, under the rule of harmless error, only
those which actually impair the substantial rights of the parties will justify a
new trial.' 77 Indeed, only those litigants whose rights actually have been sub-
stantially violated deserve new trials. The Nevada Supreme Court was on the
right track when it noted, "[t]he above errors were individually neither prejudi-
cial nor egregious .... ,,17 But the court reversed direction immediately,
stating that "viewed in their entirety, [the conduct and comments] were clearly
erroneous and potentially prejudicial to Oade's case."' 179 Thus, in one sen-
tence, the rule of harmless error analysis, long recognized and solidified by
Nevada law, was turned on its head. Thankfully for Oade, he obtained what he
wanted and most certainly deserved - a new trial. Unfortunately, however, the
Nevada Supreme Court made more convoluted that which before has not been
in dispute: in cases involving judicial commentary on the evidence, the rule of
harmless error applies and no new trial should be ordered unless the appellant's
substantial rights have been violated.
Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court's "potentially prejudicial" analy-
sis in Oade is erroneous to the extent it applies to judicial commentary on the
175 See Barrett v. State, 776 P.2d 538 (Nev. 1989).
176 Id. at 541.
177 See NEV. R. Civ. P. 61, which states, in pertinent part: "The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." (emphasis added).
178 See id.
179 Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 339 (Nev. 1998).
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evidence. Such analysis is not supported by Nevada law, and should be
regarded as an inappropriate deviation from established procedure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nevada Supreme Court's determination in Oade v. State that the trial
judge's comments were potentially prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair
trial constitutes an impermissible deviation from Nevada law. Trial judges are
prohibited from commenting on evidence presented at trial both by the Nevada
Constitution and by Nevada statute.' 80 When there is a violation of those pro-
visions, as there unmistakably was in Oade, the court should evaluate the com-
ments in light of the rule of harmless error. ' 8' This rule requires a showing that
a party was actually prejudiced before a new trial will be granted.182
In light of these rules and clearly established procedure for evaluating
improper comments, the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Oade to treat
improper comments as potentially prejudicial should not be given much weight.
To the extent that Oade's "potentially prejudicial" standard applies to judicial
commentary on the evidence, it may indeed stand for the unfortunate principle
that a new trial may be granted merely because a judge's comments are poten-
tially prejudicial. Indeed, Oade does not require a showing of actual prejudice
in reversing and ordering a new trial. This standard violates the sound policy
of judicial efficiency and the quick resolution of legal disputes.
Moreover, a "potentially prejudicial" standard will likely increase a liti-
gant's chances for a new trial even where a judge's comments may not have
actually prejudiced his case. Consequently, litigants are more likely to venture
an appeal. If the standard is accepted and followed, the number of cases
ordered re-tried may increase dramatically. This is a wasteful and unnecessary
result. The Nevada Supreme Court's "potentially prejudicial" standard
announced in Oade should be disregarded, and in all cases involving improper
judicial commentary on the evidence, the rule of harmless error should apply.
180 Id.
181 NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 12; NEV. REV. STAT. 3.230 (2001).
182 Wheeler v. Twin Lakes Riding Stable, Inc., 500 P.2d 572, 573 (Nev. 1972).
